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Abstract: Usually, high acquisition premia are considered to be a proxy for aggressive management style, 
extremely risk-taking behavior and poor managerial decision making and ultimately failure. In the case of 
China, it is questionable if this assumption can hold true. In general, cross border M&A failure rate is high 
and did not vary significantly over time. A study by KPMG found that only 17% of cross-border acquisitions 
created shareholder value, while 53% of acquisitions destroyed shareholder value or just broke even 
(KPMG, 2013; Shimizu et al., 2004) How comes that, if profits and appropriate acquisition premia, crucial 
for success, are extremely hard to generate, still so many Chinese investors acquire European targets? 
Employing a dataset of 531 Chinese outward cross-border M&As over the period of 1996 to 2017, roughly 
half of it is conducted by SOE. This paper finds that, on average Chinese MNEs pay higher acquisition 
premia than other Non-Chinese investors do for similar targets. The question that arises out of these findings 
is why Chinese investors are willing to pay more than their peers? 
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I. Introduction 
 
In general, Cross Border Acquisition Premium from emerging markets are considered to be particularly high. 
(Heather & Wolff, 2012) Usually, these investors argue that, due to the fact that they have to overcome 
geographical and cultural distances and compensate for their late comer status and lower reputation, higher 
premiums are necessary, in order to win a tender or sign a takeover deal. (Peng, 2012). Usually, high acquisition 
premia are linked to poor managerial decision making eventually risking failure. (Sirower, 1997) This notion 
seems to not entirely fit and can not be generalized to the recent Chinese merger wave experienced in Europe 
due to China’s unique institutional setting and structural legacy. China is in general not following the traditional, 
conventional development path and challenging economic theory. Therefore, it is questionable if overpayment 
in the Chinese context is really related to irrational managerial decision making. 
 
I argue that, besides the very common non-deal related drivers like supply and demand and business cycles and 
the very understandable reasons of geographical and cultural distance, the role of state-ownership is a key factor 
in explaining high acquisition premiums paid by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) in Europe. Chinese 
SOE have proven to be direct tools of the Chinese government in putting into practice national policies. (Caves, 
1982; Stopford, Strange, & Henley, 1991; Murtha & Lenway, 1994). Overall, the increasingly important role of 
SOE in developing countries is part of a broader trend. The role of state-owned enterprises has changed 
dramatically during the last two decades and SOE play a more active role in general and in particular in China. 
(Ramamurti, 2008) This is especially true for emerging markets. (Heather & Wolff, 2012) Governments excel 
their influence in a more direct way. (Caves, 1982; Stopford, Strange, & Henley, 1991; Murtha & Lenway; 
Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, & Zheng, 2007; Young & McGuinness, 2001) However, due to scarcity in 
trustworthy data, I can only limit my quantitive research to the analysis of Chinese investors as a whole compared 
to other investors and Chinese State-owned enterprises in contrast to private companies. Nevertheless, I do 
believe that the effect of Chinese investors paying more is triggered by the effect of the ownership indirectly. 
Therefore, I will investigate the effect of ownership in my Chinese sample and contrast POE and SOE. In order 
to explain this effect, theory will be introduced and help to understand the key drivers. 
 
 
The “Going Out” policy and the “One Belt One Road” Policy are pragmatic and intelligent attempts to deal with 
overcapacities and to establish Chinese brands on the world market. Did Chinese investors acquire target at all 
costs? If investors paid more than other investors at the same time for similar targets, what might be the reason 
that Chinese investor value European targets higher than other non-Chinese investors do?  
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II. Aim  
 
The economic raise of China, as an investor is a relatively new phenomenon, that has to be observed and 
analyzed. Recent research shows that despite firms’ efforts to create value and synergy opportunities by 
engaging in M&As (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993), almost half of the M&As turns out to be unsuccessful 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009). In the 30 years of research regarding the 
development of M&As nothing has changed (Leeth and Borg, 2000). Napier (1989) found that throughout 
the years this failure rate did not vary significantly. A recent study by KPMG found that only 17% of cross-
border acquisitions created shareholder value, while 53% of acquisitions destroyed shareholder value 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). The remaining percentage of acquisitions broke even. Although research reveals 
these unfavorable failure rates, acquisitions are increasingly popular and as a result of globalization and 
MNE cross-border activity, this paradox is experienced worldwide (Datta and Puia, 1995; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004). Observers are concerned about the performance of the target and the financial stability of 
the acquirer and what these factors have of an impact on future performance. Especially, the impact of a 
high premium on later performance of the target. Also the European media and business community is 
shocked by the pace and determinant attitude Chinese investors show in Europe. Thus, Chinese acquirer, 
especially SOE got criticized and do not enjoy comparable market access possibilities due to increasing 
investment barriers, political opposition, and new institutional restrictions (Davies, 2010). High premia raise 
concerns about the competition situation on the European market, since not every acquirer has the Chinese 
government with 1,4 trillion dollars of foreign exchange reserves as a stakeholder. Therefore, investigating 
whether Chinese investors systematically overpay is important. But answering this question is not easy even 
though a huge body of literature exists, scholars do not understand how the price of a deal is in reality 
produced. Valuation is a very case-sensitive matter and every company is unique. Therefore, valuation is 
often much more of an art than a science, since many factors that are hard to quantify and capture play a 
role in finding a price for a company and valuation is by far not a standard procedure. (Damodoran, 2011; 
Fernandez, 2004) Additionally, conflicting interests, information asymmetry, agency problems, different 
institutional settings, are all very hard to capture and might differ from case to case and country to county. 
This is probably the reason why a vast body of literature fails to fully understand the drivers of acquisition 
premia. It seems very obvious that ownership is a very important driver when it comes to measure the way 
a company competes. So far, the role of SOE in M&A got neglected for good reason since governments 
traditionally invested domestically and played a less-direct role in foreign direct investment. The above is 
particularly true in countries like China where most of the shares of listed companies are still controlled by 
the state (Lau, Fan, Young & Wu, 2007). Therefore, research about the role of SOE in mergers and 
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acquisition is important to fully understand the dynamics of the transactions and to better judge the Chinese 
activities in Europe. (Chen & Young, 2010) Unfortunately, despite the obvious relevance of the topic 
researchers have not put much emphasis on this topic when analyzing the Chinese M&A waves. There is 
not much data available on the topic and even a very expensive database like Bloomberg does not disclosure 
the full picture. The names and industries are always announced but often the announced premium is not 
disclosured. This is a problem for empirical research. Also from a theoretical point of view, no model or 
theory has been developed for the current situation. (Urbšienė et al. 2015) (Bargeron, et al. 2008) 
 
 
 
This paper is organized as follows: the first section reviews the literature on the topic of M&A: in particular 
premiums, premium determinants and the role of ownership on premia and what is specific about Chinese 
acquirers. Next, a methodology is introduced on how to investigate the research question and how to analyze the 
two data samples. In the third section, a comparison between the premiums paid by Chinese and European 
acquirers for similar targets in Europe is presented. Moreover, in the last section, conclusions are made and 
directions for future research on the topic are provided. 
 
 
III. Literature review  
 
There are prior attempts to tackle similar research questions, the study of Guo et al. (2016). investigates in 
general Chinese cross border M&A around the world and found that SOEs tend to pay higher acquisition 
premiums when engaging in cross-border merger activity as compared to non-SOEs. According to these findings, 
this is first due to the fact that these companies are part of the state allocation system and enjoy privileged access 
to financial support from the government. Second, goals such as social welfare and political interests lead to 
different incentive structures; and third, SOE are simply less efficient in making managerial decisions. Moreover, 
corporate government structures have more weaknesses than private owned enterprises (POE) and agency 
problems occur more frequently. Moreover, Urbšienė et al. 2015, Bargeron et al.2008 and Asplund, 2012 came 
to similar conclusions. But not all research found Chinese investor to overpay. Betschinger, (2012). argues the 
complete opposite and finds that the influence on the government even allows to negotiate lower premia due to 
political ties and preferential deals. Since there is not much consensus about the matter, my goal is to update 
prior research and to gather findings out of these studies together in order to draw conclusions and to apply this 
knowledge to my dataset. In a more general context, much of the research sees the role of the government and 
especially the state ownership on cross-border business activity critically. This literature qualifies governments 
as an obstacle to cross-border M&A activity having a negative impact. But there are many reasons to belief that 
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a government and a state ownership can have a positive impact on M&A. Of course, a government also has to 
monitor markets in order to detect competition issues and intervene and express antitrust and protectionist 
concerns (Seldeslachts, Clougherty, & Barros, 2008) In the case of China, the government plays an encouraging 
role. The role of SOE has changed over time and the role the Chinese government increasingly plays in global 
competition is different to the existing literature on government ownership in general. Even thought in the West, 
the influence of government controlled companies has vanished with the rise of domestic enterprises in emerging 
nations. (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009) The role of the government is particular strong in China compared to 
other countries. This becomes especially obvious in the context of mergers and acquisitions. In countries like 
China and India, the government is increasingly active in encouraging companies to go abroad and to compete. 
Many of these large enterprises are state-owned, and this ownership structure presents some challenges to 
traditional theories and their underlying assumptions. Research is needed to investigate this new role the 
government is playing. Especially, the role of SOEs in order to update findings and take these new tendencies 
into account. Not surprisingly, scholars call for new theory development in order to better estimate the growing 
influence of the government on firms and economics. (Guo et al. 2016; Cheng et al. 2011) 
 
3.1 The waves of Chinese investment  
 
China’s adherence to the Word Trade Organization (WTO) marked an important turning point in 
globalization strategies of Chinese MNE. Policy maker urged Chinese companies to become more 
competitive and to better integrate into the world economy. Foreign brands entered China and this growing 
rivalry from already established brands gave the Chinese government reason to seek market opportunities 
abroad. The Chinese government urged local companies to make acquisitions abroad. Acquisitions in 
Europe were still very small at that time. In general, we can observe three broad waves of Chinese M&A 
activity in Europe. The aim of the first phase of outbound M&A deals until 2006 was to improve product 
designs, brands, distribution and sometimes production capacity. The notion behind this wave, was to 
increase sales and market shares in foreign markets. However, in the beginning not all transactions proved 
to be successful. In some cases, Chinese companies have chosen to exit, because the goal of market share 
was not met and companies made substantial losses.  Reasons for these loses are usually in relation with the 
acquisition integration and concerns about quality and labor and some general issues with the operation 
itself. (Williamson, 2016) China has in the beginning mainly acquired distressed companies or companies 
whose competitive advantage used to be culture, people, systems or brands. (Holweg & Oliver 2012) But 
unfortunately, people, systems and brands are very hard to transfer and implement in a foreign country and 
culture. From the Chinese side, there also was considerable disappointment about the transfer of outdated 
models to China by Western firms (the Volkswagen Santana for instance), with little technology transfer 
and capability development taking place in new product development. (Holweg & Oliver, 2012) 
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The second wave of acquisitions was more of a resource seeking wave after 2006. Deals were aimed at securing 
raw materials and energy resources for China. Besides, few deals, mainly in Russia, Europe was not the prior 
target of resource seeking deals. Besides, there was also a boom in acquisitions of stakes in financial services 
companies abroad in 2007 as Chinese financial institutions with large cash reserves sought to expand their 
operations abroad. Obviously, the financial crisis during that time hit Chinese investors hard, same goes for the 
industry in general. (Williamson, 2016) Since these financial deals occurred, I will later not exclude financial 
deals out of the regression analysis, because they are part of the history of Chinese M&A in Europe and should 
be taken account of. The third wave of acquisitions has mainly targeted “industrial” companies with the aim to 
improve technology, know-how, and sometimes brand recognition.  These deals received less press attention, 
because they were still small in number. To conclude, the first two waves of Chinese M&A activities did not 
focus on European targets in particular, but once the aim of Chinese Out-Bond Merger activity shifted toward 
technology and brands, European companies became attractive. Some of the sectors of these early transactions 
were automotive in western Europe with the aim to improve safety systems, fuel consumption and emissions 
reduction, as well as core capabilities in designing automotive components. (Williamson, 2016) (Holweg & 
Oliver, 2012) To summarize, what is noticeable is that regardless the industry, mainly SOE but also POE have 
focused on acquiring western MNE with leading positions in their respective markets.  (Chen & Young, 2010). 
 
3.2 Definition Acquisition Premium  
 
In order to better understand my research question, first the term of acquisition premia has to be defined and 
to be explained why premia are important. Premia are important because many mergers turn out to be a lot 
less successful than expected. Often irrational decision making leads to high premiums. But what does 
paying too much really mean? First of all, there is no one single price when it comes to acquisitions. In 
literature, the term is explained as the difference between the actual cost of acquiring a target and an estimate 
of the targets pre-acquisition value. Often, the premium gets defined as the ratio of the negotiated price of 
one target’s share and the price at which the target’s share is traded in the market (Laamanen, 2007; Sirower 
& Sahni, 2006) (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Halleblian et al., 2009). For later econometric analysis, I calculate 
it based on the definition in the literature, as the percentage difference between market value of the target 
firm and announced value of the deal.  
 
There are different types of investment and one can very broadly divide into: greenfield investments, 
portfolio investments, acquisition and merger. First, there is the greenfield investment, this form of 
investment is rather rare in combination with Chinese investors. Besides, Joint Venture tend to occur more 
frequently, a form in which the investing acquirer company merges with one or several target companies 
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and creates a new company. These companies usually emerge, if the acquirer depends on local expertise 
and knowledge or if regulation force companies to engage with a local partner, as this has been the case for 
foreign companies in China. Merger and acquisitions are either foreign portfolio investments or foreign 
direct investments. A company can choose to invest in different forms of investment: capital, know how, 
patents. However, for econometric analysis joint ventures are not relevant, because no data on acquisition 
premia is available.  
 
3.3 The difference between value and price of an acquisition 
 
The matter of M&A is very complex and there is no general guarantee for success. The uncomfortable truth 
is that many researchers do not truly understand how premia are really produced. A high premium for 
instance does not automatically lead to success, also size of the company is not automatically leading to a 
high premium. (Mellen &Evans, 2010) Value and price in M&A are very different concepts. So some 
sources describe value as an individualistic perception, that also seem to vary among different agents (PWC, 
2013) Literature distinguishes different types of valuation methods: balance sheet based, income statement 
based, mixed, cash flow discounting, value creation and option based methods are the most common. There 
are different preferences, but however some authors agree on the fact that discount cash flow (DCF) models 
are most frequent.  (Damodoran, 2011; Fernandez, 2004). There are differences between the buyer and the 
seller side, the buyer side is more likely to use DCF. But all these methods do not change the fact, that there 
is not much consensus about the “right valuation method” and the “right fair value”. A vast body of literature 
admits, that it is impossible to calculate the one right correct value, because many valuation methods depend 
on of estimations and assumptions and might differ therefore (Damodaran, 2011). Some methods like DCF 
even use insider information and are time consuming. (Havnaer, 2012). Also the current market situation is 
taken into account by some methods, so that value differs over time. (Damodoran, 2011; Fernandez, 2004). 
The valuation is even part of the negotiation process and some metrics likes EBIT or EBITDA penalizes the 
buyer, or the DCF that is preferred by the buyer, so metrics are also used in the context of negotiation and 
parties can influence the valuation outcome depending on the method they use and the intention they have. 
(Mellen &Evans, 2010) However, the most frequently used metrics to estimate acquisition premia is the 
market capitalization or in other words the price of shares times the number of shares traded at the stock 
exchange.  (Hayward & Hambrick 1997; Gupta & Misra, 2007; Varaiya &Ferris, 1987; Guo, Clougherty & 
Duso, 2013). The price of the target paid by the acquirer using either stock or cash, is the value of the target 
company to the acquirer plus a premium. (Fernandez, 2004). The price of the deal is usually paid with a 
premium because otherwise no seller would be prepared to sell at the companies’ market value. However, 
in some cases target companies sell at market value or even below market value and accept a negative 
acquisition premium. The premium in this context depend to a high extent on the fact, if the target was at 
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the times of negotiations already valued fairly, or might be overvalued. An important indicator for fair actual 
market value is the payment method the acquirer company manager would agree too. A cash deal is sending 
positive signals to the market. (Rappaport & Sirower, 1999) (Mellen &Evans, 2010) Moreover, one can 
distinguish value into intrinsic value, market value (market capitalization), purchase price and synergy 
value. Most basically, the intrinsic value is capturing the current situation by the net present value of 
expected future cash flows. The market value or called current market capitalization is the share price and 
assumes that there are investors willing to buy the company at the valuation of the company. Purchase Price 
is the price that a potential bidder believes to have to pay to be accepted by the target shareholders. Synergy 
Value is the net present value of the cash flows that will result from improvements made when the companies 
are combined. Value Gap is the difference between the intrinsic value and the purchase price. (Mellen 
&Evans, 2010) The bottom line is that there is no one single price and that everything might be pretty 
relative- what might be expensive in Europe seem to be a bargain for a cash-rich Chinese Acquirer.  
 
 
3.4 Why do we talk about Takeover premiums? Implications for M&A success  
 
The question that arises is: what are the implications of a high premium? A high acquisition premium is 
usually considered in literature in a non-Chinese context as a poor managerial decision risking any possible 
future synergies. The danger for an acquiring company is to lower the firm value, as the ‘overpayment’ 
consumes from the expected synergies that must be achieved simply to sustain an acquired firm’s market 
value. (Sirower, 1997; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Cartwright and Cooper, 
1993) Overpayment occurs not only in China but in many other countries, in the U.S. for instance acquirer 
paid an average acquisition premium in the range of 30-50 percent of target market values for the past three 
decades (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Walkling & Edmister, 1985; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). Even though 
many studies revealed that high acquisition premiums frequently destroy value (Sirower & Sahni, 2006; 
Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005), companies continue to pay high premiums. Bloomberg indicates 
that the world average premium for all industries in 2012 was 31.2% and 30% in 2013 (Bloomberg, 2017). 
The takeover premium is an important factor in determining the success of a takeover, as well as for the 
gains for both acquirers’ and targets’ shareholders (Eckbo, 2009; Henry, 2004; Franks and Mayer 1996;  
Very and Schweiger, (2001) showed that the level of the offered premium plays a significant role in whether 
the takeover fails or is successful. Similarly, Cheng et al. (1989) found relations between takeover premium, 
return on assets and firm profit. Others have related the success of an acquisition with procedures and 
contracts that could result in advantages for the target firm (Eckbo, 2009)(Leeth & Borg, 2000; Datta et al., 
1992). Although, the vast majority of empirical evidence shows positive returns for target firms, others 
provide arguments for the benefits of acquiring firms in the takeover process. For instance, Lang et al. 
(1989) found that shareholders of acquiring organizations gain value when the takeover bid is high. This 
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indicates that even when a higher level of premium is paid, acquirers’ shareholders can still benefit from an 
acquisition. Similar evidence is found by Hirshleifer and Titman (1990). They reveal that acquirers are more 
likely to be successful in a bid when the offered premium increases. Nevertheless, competition has a huge 
impact on premia, and the number of bidders impacts the success rate.  (Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990).  
Often contra-dictionary findings show the complex matter of the topic. Even tough in some cases high 
premiums still allow to increase shareholder value, for my analysis I assume that excessively and 
systematically overpaying risks future synergy gains, the initial motivation to engage in the transaction. In 
the next section, I will therefore further explore motivations. 
 
 
 
3.5 Motives for Merger 
 
My research question is to answer if Chinese investors and  SOE tend to overpay: in order to understand 
why an overpayment might be produced, investigating motives is crucial. A price and therefore an 
overpayment might become very relative when a higher strategic purpose is served. In most case, mergers 
serve a certain purpose and this purpose might be very difficult to quantify and put into relation with the 
cost of a transaction. Therefore, I would like to use this section to introduce the most frequent motives 
behind deals in order to show the diverse nature, different extent and complex dimension of deals. In section 
3, in my descriptive statistics, I will apply this theoretical knowledge to my dataset and put the sample into 
a broader context. 
 
In theory, the most common motives are related to a firm’s strategy. And the ultimate goal is to create value, 
most likely by creating synergies. Moreover, besides synergy and value creation, often dubious motives are 
the reason for a merger. Value creation can be achieved by synergy, growth, increasing market power, 
acquiring unique capabilities or resources, unlocking hidden value. In cross border merger exploiting market 
imperfections, overcoming adverse government policies, technology transfer, product differentiation or 
following clients are common motives to engage in cross border mergers. To the dubious motives count tax 
considerations, diversification and a manager’s personal interest. (Mellen &Evans, 2010: 81-86) The 
creation of value can be accomplished through increased market power, for instance, by forming strategic 
alliances, or even monopolies or oligopolies. Other motives for creating value through M&As are suggested 
to be efficiency motives (Haleblian et al., 2009; Andrade et al. 2001; Pilloff and Santomero, 1997). In 
general, there are five types of synergies: cost savings, revenue enhancements, process improvements, 
financial engineering and tax benefits. Cost savings are considered as “hard synergies” and are very likely 
to achieve. This can be achieved by eliminating jobs, facilities, and related expenses from economies of 
scale. Mergers in the same industry and same country allow to realize high cost savings. Nevertheless, 
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acquirers often underestimate how long it will take to realize cost savings and therefore it is no wonder why 
it is so hard to predict the synergy value beforehand. This holds true for synergies like revenue 
enhancements. The estimation of synergy gains through revenue enhancement or tax reliefs requires external 
variables that are often beyond management’s control. (Mellen &Evans, 2010: 81-86) Obviously, in the 
Chinese context macro driver and a higher national interest are very important motives. China is in a 
constant reform process and has been for many decades due to its cheap labor supply a popular destination 
for European investors. Since the beginning of the century, the direction of investments has changed and 
now China is investing more and more abroad. The going-out-policy and the internationalization of Chinese 
MNE started already long before and especially in the beginning not all transactions were successful. 
(Chuang, 2016) With the time, the incentives for Chinese investors in Europe have multiplied. In the 
beginning those incentives were mainly market-seeking and resource-seeking motives in a context of 
double-digit GDP growth. Some of the incentives in this context are moving up the value chain and the 
desire to establish Chinese brands and MNE. In addition to that, due to high energy demand and high 
resource demand, resource seeking motives make Chinese investors invest abroad. With a slowing down of 
the economy and a shift towards domestic consumption the incentives to reach out for new markets and to 
invest money outside of the country are even higher since overcapacities are a dangerous threat to the 
Chinese economy and the new OBOR policy, an attempt to deal with this dangerous misbalance. Moreover, 
the China 2025 plan wants to make china an innovation champion in the manufacturing sector and further 
increase automatization. (E&Y, 2016)  
 
3.6. Theory explaining high premia  
There are many different approaches, one could choose to try to explain the ongoing trend of Chinese merger 
activity in Europe, this section will introduce the most important concepts and perspectives that has to be 
taken into account when assessing acquisition premia. In this sense, resource theory might be the most 
fundamental concept in this context trying to explain in general why foreign companies engage in merger 
and acquisition in the first place. The rationale behind this theory is that companies try to acquire resources 
they do not have themselves or in their home market. These resources might be sophisticated technology, 
know how, management expertise or many more. In general, SOEs seek foreign resources and opportunities 
to overcome their competitive backwardness in their home market (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). Since some 
resources and competencies are not easily available in China, these firms are likely to bid high for these 
resources, as they potentially value the targets more than MNEs that already hold such resources (Boardman, 
Freeman, & Eckel, 1986; Boardman & Vining, 1989; Megginson, Nash, & van Randenborgh, 1994). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that in some cases, Chinese acquirer did not pay too much, but valued 
the target companies higher according to their home market conditions. This goes especially for cases like 
brands, technology and resources.  
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However, resource theory might help to explain why cross-border M&A transaction, takes place in the first 
place and to a certain extent, why in some cases, investors value targets higher and are therefore willing to 
pay more, but systematically overpayment seem to be caused by more than just differences in availability 
of resources in different markets. In theory, investors should pay all the same regardless of their country of 
origin. The Capital Asset price model (CAPM) one of the most fundamental concepts in asset valuation in 
finance, predicts that under the assumption of availability of information the market reacts to overvalued or 
undervalued shares. So the investors will buy efficient assets and sell inefficient assets and investors should 
pay regardless of their country of origin the same prices. (Schweser, 2015) 
 
But one important underlying assumption of this model is information symmetry or the equal access to 
information. Since reality is often very far away from this model world, it is in this case also very reasonable 
to believe, that this fundamental assumption of the CAPM is not met and availability of information plays 
a big role in explaining why assets might tend to be overvalued. It is well-documented from corporate 
governance literature that SOE tend to struggle in particular with information asymmetries. Therefore, I 
argue, that information asymmetries have a major impact on acquisition premia. In the following, I will 
further explain the further scenarios of information asymmetry from a corporate governance perspective. 
 
There are different possible scenarios in which investors suffer of information asymmetry and therefore pay 
more: 1) they could pay more because they do not have access to the right information to accordingly 
estimate the fair value, 2) they have access but have technical difficulties to assess the fair value, 3) a third 
option would be that the manager has technical access to information, has the right tools and knowledge to 
assess the fair value but choses to pay more because of a managerial self-interest and moral hazard. 
Therefore, information symmetry only exits for some agents of a company but not to all decision maker 
involved. In addition to the information asymmetry argument, a very broad body of literature investigates 
this moral hazard problem, that will be tackled later. (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010; La Porta et al., 
1999; Goergen and Renneboog, 2003; Franks and Mayer, 2001; Jürgens et al., 2000). Coming back to my 
argument of the three scenarios, I find that literature confirms these three possibilities. The first scenario 
can be explained by the fact, that much of the country specific and industry knowledge was not familiar to 
Chinese investors and therefore, Chinese investors had difficulties in estimating the fair value. This is in 
line with literature, as Laamanen (2007) comments, acquisition premium may be justified when target firms’ 
resources are difficult for the market to value.  Thus, the efficient market hypothesis can not hold true in the 
case of China, since Chinese investors had especially in the beginning, when investing abroad substantial 
obstacles to overcome and given their lack of experience and contacts it is reasonable to think that they 
suffered from a lack of information. Some scholars call this lack of knowledge the liability of foreignness 
 14 
(Zaheer, 1995). Information asymmetries usually exist in the processes of due diligence, negotiations, and 
post-acquisition management planning. (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012) The acquirer has difficulties in 
assessing the true value of the target firm due to a few reasons: 1) the target may not disclose complete 
information about itself; 2) the acquirers and targets belong to different institutional environments (Shimizu, 
Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). Information are already important to domestic activities but become 
even more important when engaging in transactions abroad especially if some of the information is of 
implicit nature. (Gaur & Malhotra, 2012). The second scenario describes the lack of ability in estimating 
fair value. Poor managerial decision making might further increase information-asymmetry problems of 
finding the true value of a target company. We should not forget that China is still in many aspects a 
developing country and has not much experience in conducting M&A deals. There are different accounting 
standards, language barriers and differences in regulations and legislations. Moreover, China is offering less 
property rights to investors and shareholder protection and information flows might not be the same. The 
third scenario describes a more active decision against shareholder’s benefits and usually the own managers 
of a firm are the cause of the lack of information. In this scenario the foreign investors are actively hindering 
information to flow to harm their own company in order to act in their own interest. This might be due to 
different attitudes towards risk and personal incentives. Agents might be willing to take more risk compared 
to principals. Monitoring cost are high and therefore principals are not always monitoring the actions of 
agents. (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gaspar et al., 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007). These information problems are known 
to be especially severe for Chinese SOE, because weakness in governance are especially frequent. In order 
to further discuss these governance weaknesses, I am going to introduce the agency theory in order to 
explain the third scenario of lack of information. Agency theory is a fundamental concept important to 
understand moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Agency theory is especially important to 
understand Chinese SOE, since these problems tend to occur more frequently in SOE. In general, agency 
theory relates to the situation during the takeover process when shareholders (principals) and managers 
(agents) have different goals (Kesner et al., 1994). These conflicting interests are especially severe since 
those shareholders investing in the deal are those paying for the cost of this problem (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Walkling, 1984). If the acquirer 's managers benefit personally by buying the target 
above its fair value, agency theory suggests that managers will act in their interest and engage in an action 
that increase their own utility function.  (Walkling and Long, 1984). (Kesner et al., 1994; Jensen, 1986; 
Walkling, 1984; Bathala et al., 1994). Jensen and Murphy (1990) showed that CEOs might have the 
incentive to conduct a deal against their shareholders, if this deal increases size of the firm and therefore 
lead to higher salaries. (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), However, this risk of moral 
hazard is more hidden in manager’s incentive structures might not be always obvious. (Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004). There is not a clear empirical evidence proving the relationship of positive premiums and agency 
costs  (Hartzell et al., 2004; Moeller, 2005). This mainly due, to the fact that this hypothesis is very hard to 
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prove and therefore literature lacks not surprisingly of evidence. (Haleblian et al., 2009; Shimizu et al., 
2004; Angwin, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sudarsanam et al.) 
 
Besides the agency perspective, the national context accounts to a large extent in explaining excessive 
bidding behavior and I am going to use this section to explain differences in property rights. The role of 
government regulations and governance structures are key in explaining the attractiveness of acquisitions 
(Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Haleblian et al., 2009; Teerikangas & Very, 2006). 
Importan macro economic driver and institutional differences account to a very large account and once can 
say that differences in shareholder protection incentives investors to seek better market opportunities and to 
invest in countries, in which they enjoy the most favorable conditions to invest. So even if in some countries 
returns seem to be high, the fact that this investor can not enforce its claim leads to the fact, that this country 
is not attractive for other investors. In China, one example of such weak investor protection would be the 
fact, that Chinese investors do not have the right to elect the board from distance but have to be present in 
person to vote for major corporate decisions. This can be a huge disadvantage in a country like China where 
geographical distances do not always allow to be present to vote in the favor of the investor. Therefore, it is 
not surprising why Chinese investor seek to invest abroad. In addition to that, classical problems such as 
country risks and uncertainties, cultural differences hinder or incentive investors to invest in a certain legal, 
institutional environment. An important factor, in the Chinese case is the relative underdevelopment of the 
financial market. China is a country in which the financial market is the last segment of the country that is 
not yet reformed and financial flow help to orchestra reforms and control the overall economic development. 
Therefore, this underdevelopment leads to increasing willingness to invest capital in safer, more predictable 
environments with more friendly regulations and conditions. It goes without saying that all these factors not 
only influence the willingness to invest but also the potential success of a transaction and the value creation 
of this endeavor. (Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006; Lu and Beamish, 2004; Shimizu et al., 2004; Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004).  
China’s unique institutional setting with fairly weak property rights and low shareholder protection makes 
Chinese investors seek opportunities abroad to hedge against inflation and to seek safe investment 
opportunities with higher returns than in their home market. For many ordinary people with limited access 
to resources and information the stock market or real estate market is the only way to hedge against inflation. 
Thus, incentives to invest abroad are manifold.  This holds especially true if these transactions go with 
preferred visa schemes and other opportunities for Chinese individuals to acquire a foreign citizenship and 
bring their savings out of China. (Opper, 2012) 
 
Shareholder protection is an important factor and research found that organizations in countries 
characterized by strong shareholder protection were significantly more dispersed than countries with lower 
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shareholder protection. (La Porta et al., 1999) The relatively large number of shareholders in organizations 
with highly dispersed ownership traditionally result in lower levels of monitoring and free-riding problems 
(De Miguel et al., 2004; Schleifer & Vishny, 1986). Besides the incentive side, differences in shareholder 
protection also leads to different perceptions of those involved in the acquisition bargaining process and 
those investors who are not involved in the bargaining process end up being less informed and this might 
lead to the fact, that those investors develop different perceptions and opinions. Out of this information lack, 
free-riding problems occur and in general a misbalanced information structure can only lead to conflicts and 
misunderstandings.  (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). The concentration of ownership is a rather complex area, and 
some authors argue that larger proportions of shares held by shareholders, increases firm value due to 
monitoring efforts of block holders. For those Shareholder monitoring and management might be too 
expensive, especially for those with a minimum stake in the company. (Schleifer &Vishny, 1986 ; De 
Miguel et al. 2004) 
 
 
 
3.7 Determinants of Acquisition Premiums 
 
 
Figure 3.71. Acquisition Premium driver (compiled by the author) 
 
Acquisitions are rather complex transactions and literature has failed to fully understand the driver of 
premia. This is mainly due to the broad number of different determinants that have been found to be related 
to the amount of acquisition premia. I will use this section to show the complexity of acquisition driver 
being aware that I also only display the most common driver identified by literature. This section should 
give the reader a sense of how premia are been produced in reality. (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2010). In brief, 
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one can divide these determinants into three groups: first the market related factors, second the deal related 
factors and third the factors that are neither related to the market nor to the deal but that impact premia. I 
start first by introducing market related factors. In some cases, a premium is not much more than a function 
of factors like: business cycles, demand and supply, and other markets conditions such as liquidity in the 
market. (Schlingemann, Stulz, &Walkling 2002). A too low liquidity for instance might make prices 
decrease further, so the simple rules of supply and demand apply to premia. (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992) In 
this vein, competition matters and the number of competing bidders have been found to impact the premium. 
Varaiya (1987) discovered a significant positive relationship between takeover premia and bidding 
competitions.  Moreover, geographical reasons matter: a number of studies have found the closeness 
between the acquirer and target to be an influential factor on post-M&A performance (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Patel & King, 2011). Distance in a cultural, knowledge and geographical way is critical as a transaction 
indicator. Also the fact, that a deal might be a cross-border or domestic deal is of great importance.  (Rossi 
& Volpin 2004) 
 
 
Second, I am going to introduce the deal related factors: it is well recognized that premiums size, industry, 
number of employees, valuation outcome, experience, management expertise and pedigree of advisory has 
a strong impact on premia.  (Hope et al., 2011; Jahera, Hand, & Lloyd, 1985; Nathan & O’Keefe, 1989; 
Shelton, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 2001; Slusky & Caves, 1991; Walkling & Edmister, 1985). However, the 
human role is a very important factor and experience, background and personal characteristics can affect 
the value of the deal. (Eckbo, 2009; Experience is seen as a crucial firm characteristic, since an organization 
learns from earlier inefficiencies with respect to their acquiring strategies. A company is known to pay a 
higher premium if this company has conducted successful transactions in the past (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Strong managerial skills and efforts in the integration process will translate into higher 
shareholder value (Teerikangas &Very, 2006). Research suggest that shareholders of well-managed 
companies are significantly better off. (Hirshleifer & Titman, 1990). Nevertheless, the human factor in the 
deal can have adverse effects, too. Management hubris, resistance to takeovers, bad investment advisory 
might lead to value destruction and high premia. The hubris problem, moral hazard and the agency problem 
occurs if the management actually knows that they may overpay for the target, but they still proceed with 
the acquisition for their own sake. Like the agency motive, hubris is not easily quantifiable. Hostile 
takeovers are usually expensive since the existing management will initiate defense mechanism (Beckman 
& Haunschild, 2002; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild, 1994; Robinson & Shane, 1990; Roll, 1986; 
Sinha, 1992). Premia can also vary between industries and industry, is in general a very important driver.  
Some technology-intensive sectors with high level of R&D investments are related to higher premiums. 
(Kohers & Kohers, 2001; Laamanen, 2007). A very important factor is the fact whether a company already 
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posses shares of a certain company because this investor will have more incentives to acquire the 
outstanding shares. Walkling & Edmister (1985) finds that an ownership structure of already over 50% will 
incentivize the investor to acquire the remaining shares and to take more control, even if premia are much 
higher. (Shleifer & Vishny; 1986). High long-term debt of a target may bring potential financial synergies 
to the acquirer (Leland, 2007), but also comes with higher risk. Therefore, it may have a positive but possibly 
also a negative effect. Another important factor is the free cash flow hypothesis. Ficha et al. (2013), finds 
that cash-rich firms will acquire firms, even distressed companies with negative net present value (NPV) 
when they have abundant cash funds. Qiu et al, (2014) emphasizes that it has great impact on whether the 
management is part of the acquiring team, because this might mean that managers have incentives to pursue 
their own goals, these moral hazard situations will be explained later in more detail when introducing the 
theoretical framework. Walkling & Edmister (1985) found a significant negative relationship between target 
group bid premia and target financial leverage, valuation ratio and market to book ratio, percentage of shares 
controlled by bidders before acquisition, and a positive effect from competing bidders. The role of the 
advisory is known on having an impact on the acquisition premium and Chinese investors are known to 
employ first tier investment banks. First tier investment banks might be able to conduct the deal faster and 
to negotiate a lower premium but might charge higher fees so that a lower negotiated premium still translates 
into a higher overall premium, due to high fees of fist tier investors  The payment method is a very important 
driver that will be explained in more detail later because this method is part of my econometric model and 
serves as a control variable. Besides, the payment type, majority control is for good reason simply more 
expensive than smaller shares in ownership, Obviously, the degree to which an investor can influence and 
block decisions is the reason for this effect . (Rossi & Volpin, 2004), Sudarsanam et al. (2010), and Ficha 
et al. (2013) Dhaliwal et. al (2015) finds that shared auditors are observed in roughly 25% of all public 
acquisitions and targets are more likely to receive a bid from a firm that has the same auditor. Moreover, 
these shared auditor deals are associated with significantly lower deal premiums, lower target event returns, 
higher bidder event returns, and higher deal completion rates.  
 
Third, I will present other factors than deal-related and market-related factors, that have an impact on 
premia. Such factors are for instance diversification and synergy. If combined future cash flows of two firms 
are higher than those which the companies would have realized on their own, synergy is reached, a powerful 
driver and determinant of M&A transactions and their premia. (Damodaran, 2005). Estimating 
diversification and synergy effects are key in the value creating process and are the most important 
considerations when engaging in transactions. Obviously, given the vague nature of these estimates, 
mistakes in estimating such multiples lead to value destruction. Besides, this key aspect, location is a proxy 
for many things in economics. For good reason for instance, developing countries are known to pay higher 
premia. (Rossi & Volpin, 2000) Hope et al. (2011) found that emerging market firms tend to pay higher 
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acquisition premia for the developed-nation targets than for developing-nation targets.  A general trend 
might be the desire of the Chinese government to diversify the economy and to establish Chinese high-tech 
companies and brands. A second important driver is diversification. (Koppens, 2010; Slusky & Caves, 1991) 
The potential to achieve diversification effects, increases premia. Research found for instance that 
differences of debt ratios between target and acquirer leads to higher premia, since different debt ratios 
allow better resource allocation. The higher the difference between debt ratios, the more likely it is that 
acquirers will level up debt and enjoy the financial leverage. (Damodaran, 2005).  
 
A last important driver are national policies, national pride and the impact of ownership. These effects will 
be explained in the next section. To conclude, all this research does not change much to the fact that the 
dynamics of premia and merger in general are not yet fully understood. One of the rather unstudied areas 
are the role of the state ownership of the acquirer on premia.  This is mainly due to the fact that national 
governments traditionally played a less direct role in foreign direct investment. Thus, this area of research 
got neglected, and SOEs restricted their operating scope to the domestic economy. (Laamanen, 2007) In the 
next two sections, I will summarize some frequent issues that are common in relation to public acquirers.  
 
 
3.8 The impact of ownership structure on premia  
 
 
In order to support the research question with theoretical knowledge, this section will discuss the general 
impact of ownership on acquisition premia and also on the role of Chinese government ownership on 
Chinese Acquisition premia. There are some main points that are important: mainly manager incentives, the 
role of mixed ownership and managerial hubris.  
 
Sometimes, it is not so clear what stands behind a certain ownership structure in the Chinese context, what 
is clear is that in many cases it sill remains the state. (Wei, 2007) The corporatization and privatization of 
SOEs started already two decades ago but can not be considered accomplished the slightest. (Ramamurti, 
2000) The reality is that most shares in Chinese listed companies are still controlled by the state (Lau et. al. 
2007). The ownership of acquirers and targets are in many cases very different and it may be especially 
problematic, if a Chinese SOE acquires a private MNE in Europe. There is research suggesting that mixed 
ownership structures increase many disadvantages of both ownership systems and partial privatization often 
leads to worse outcomes than before. According to the author, such findings are universal and can be 
transferred and generalized to the interaction between SOE and POE in general. The problematic nature of 
communication between SOE and POE is not new and Boardman and Vining (1989) found that control and 
coordination becomes more complex if different management styles are mixed due to conflicts between the 
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public and private shareholders. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Chinese SOE face difficulties when 
gathering information and engaging in negotiations with western MNE. (Boardman, Eckel, & Vining, 1986). 
Such frictions may influence the quality of due diligence, crucial for estimates in assessing the future 
synergy and ultimately lead to high acquisition premia. Therefore, some sort of cultural, administrative, 
knowledge and connectedness distances arises. (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010)  
 
 
First, incentive structure of Chinese SOE will be described: the power and influence a manager might have 
during the deal process is defined by the ownership structure. In some cases, a manager has a veto right and 
can deny a deal. (De Miguel et al., 2004; Schleifer and Vishny, 1996; La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). There are actually findings that support my research question and relate the value of a deal 
to its ownership type. (Miller et al. 2009; and Chirico, 2010) SOE managers are appointed by the 
government mostly because of political reasons and not on basis on their economic performance. These 
managers act as entrepreneurs and governmental representative at the same time and have to serve a political 
interest, such goals as harmony and stability are more important than the viability or profitability of their 
company. (Walter & Howie, 2003) Compensation is also not related to performance and since manager do 
not benefit, why should they focus on increasing shareholder value? The resulting risk is that managers do 
not optimize their bidding behavior and do not aim acquisition cost reduction.  (Zhang & Parker, 2002  
Perotti, Sun, & Zou, 1999  Fan, Wong, & Zhang 2007 ; Eckbo, 2009; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haleblian et 
al., 2009 ; Peng, 2012; Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2009). Moreover, many of these managerial 
positions are only for a limited period of time and managers hope to rotate to a similar or better position 
afterwards. This leads to the fact that a manager is more concerned about the relations within the party and 
his entourage than about his economic performance as a manager. (Eckbo, 2009; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; 
Haleblian et al., 2009 ; Peng, 2012; Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2009). Especially in a high context 
culture of guanxi networks, that is based on promoting each other in networks and doing friends and 
colleagues favors in the hope to get support in the future. (Nee &Opper, 2012) Another institutional factor 
is decentralization of governmental control and delegate responsibilities to enterprise managers. This 
tendency leads to competition among different offices. (Ramamurti, 2000). Research finds that SOEs are 
less profitable due to inefficiencies resulting from weak property rights (Boardman, Freeman, & Eckel, 
1986, Rossi & Volpin, 2004) Later, Hayward (1997) finds that executives’ hubris factors revealing a 
significant positive relationship between takeover premia and target officers’ holdings, recent acquirer 
performance, media praise for the CEO. While Moeller et al. (2005) merely paid special attention to the 
large loss-making deals during the preceding merger wave. Deng (2007 & 2009), and Rui & Yip (2008) 
cultural variance between countries makes the process of integrating a foreign company more costly. (Lu 
and Beamish, 2004)  
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3.9 The impact of the government on premia 
 
As announced previously, this section is going to discuss the government influence on acquisition premia.  
The Chinese government represents a non-negligible force behind increased cross-border investment 
activity. The government, as the biggest shareholder of Chinese SOEs, plays a crucial role in this outward 
cross-border M&A activity. (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008) (Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008) 
 
 
The Chinese government supports includes measures like low-interest financing, favorable exchange rates, 
reduced taxation, industrial guidance, and subsidized insurance for expatriates. There are special funds 
dedicated to foreign trade development and foreign aid projects, export credits, simplified foreign exchange 
procedures (Peng, 2012). There is a nearly grotesque lending bias towards POE. SOE have preferential 
access to long-term/mid-term loans from state-owned banks, interest subsidies and Chinese state-owned 
development banks channel cheap loans to politically connected firms while POE do not get access to 
finance without collaterals.  (Musacchio & Flores-Macias, 2009). 
 
This favorable situation is mainly due to high foreign exchange reserves, relatively cheap labor costs and 
the resulting favorable export position that China has held over the past two decades. China holds the world’s 
largest amount of foreign reserves: US$3,254.67 billion in 2011 (The World Bank, 2012). There is 
researching finding that the government made a purposeful effort to conserve foreign exchange in order to 
support outward FDI (Luo, Xue and Han, 2010).  Given this lack of serious financial constraint it is not hard 
to understand why some very large buyouts of developed-nation targets have happened. Other scholars argue 
that the fact, that China got less harmed by the 2008 financial crisis contributed to China comparative 
advantage and helped to acquire targets in developed countries.  (Chen & Young, 2010). The policy support, 
the privileged access to finance allows more aggressive behavior in making foreign acquisitions. Therefore, 
offering higher acquisition premia for foreign targets is likely. SOEs face a softer budget constraint and 
instead of getting punished for doing non-viable operations getting rewarded by policy rewards and 
advantages. Such benefits might be tax reliefs, or better insurance policies. Social welfare and national 
strategy are more important than a firms viability and thus profitability concerns are neglected.  (Boardman, 
Freeman, & Eckel, 1986). 
 
But what might be an advantage in one aspect can be a disadvantage in another aspect. Government support 
might help to acquire targets but this support comes with a fundamental problem. This problem is that the 
government steps in as soon as the company is in difficulties. The company can count on being bailed out 
and these soft budget constraints are the core problem of state-owned enterprises. Low efficiency is the 
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ultimate result of unlimited support and soft budget constraints. But not only the fact of being bailed out in 
an emergency case is a problem: tax privileges, favorable insurance terms, and foreign industrial guidance 
makes SOE less independent and gives less incentives to improve core capabilities.  (Ahlstrom, Chen, & 
Yeh, 2010; Huang, 2003). Governments might lack competence and expertise in corporate operations to 
make effective decision monitoring (Chen & Young, 2010). There is evidence in literature that SOE are less 
efficient in dealing with risks since the massive government interventions bring immense costs. The 
bureaucratic burden in SOE is heavy and decisions have to be approved and examined by different layers 
of hierarchy. Internal conflicts and Principal –Agent issues tend to occur more frequently in SOE and 
sometimes the objectives of government ownership and minority-shareholder ownership get into conflict; 
(Chen & Young, 2010; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Su et al., 2008; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  (Baumol, 1980; Wintrobe, 1985; Bos, 1986; Negandhi & Ganguly, 1986). Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) point out that institutionalization involves the process by which social processes, 
obligations, and actualities take on a rule like status in social thought and action. (Cheng & Young, 2010; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Shenkar et. al., 1998)  This having said, it is not hard to imagine that many acquisition 
are not made for short term profit orientation but rather to follow a long-term master plan. Yet, Su, Xu, and 
Phan (2008) non-governmental shareholders may not be able to influence SOEs to the same degree that they 
can influence non-SOEs. Given this knowledge, it comes natural to develop curiosity about the impact of 
state ownership on premia in my dataset and therefore I will introduce in the next section the methodology 
and data set. Especially, state ownership in the Chinese context worth further investigation. Therefore, the 
state ownership hypothesis has to be tested. My a priori expectations are therefore that Chinese SOE pay 
significant higher acquisition premia compared to Chinese POE but also to the benchmark group of both 
private and public acquirers.  
 
 
Hypothesis:  
H1: Chinese SOE pay significant higher acquisition premia compared to POE                         
H2: Chinese SOE pay significant higher acquisition premia than benchmark group 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence and Methodology 
 
 An econometric analysis will be conducted to use different aspects of Chinese acquisitions 
internationally. Before doing the econometric analysis, some descriptive statistics will help to better 
understand the trends in the data and summary statistics of variables. The collected data consist of deals 
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from 2000 to all the way to 2017. The number of deals in a given year is not constant, which makes my data 
set a pooled cross section data. So, it contains both properties of cross section data as well as time variation. 
Having a time variation in data allows me to see dynamics in premiums paid in deals. Although there is a 
variation in time in my data, my data set is not classified as panel data, as the unit of observation (deals) are 
not the same across years. So, it would not be suitable to use panel data models such as fixed effects or 
random effects. Therefore, an Ordinary Least Square estimation technique to estimate the determinants of 
deal premium will be implemented.  
 
 
OLS Method 
An illustration of OLS for the case of two explanatory variables, X1 and X2, with Y the dependent variable 
is: Yi = α + β1X1i + β2X2i + ui 
 
OLS is considered to be a very reliable method of estimating linear relationships between economic/finance 
variables.  OLS method is used in various environments, but can only be used when it meets the following 
assumptions: where  is the dependent variable(i.e deal premium) for the ith observation in year t,  is 
the vector of parameters to be estimated and  is the vector of control variables, and  is the error term.  
Due to the limitations in my data set that is mentioned above, I will run several regression equation to analze  
driving factors of deal premium. Specifically, in my main regression, a dummy for investments from China 
will be included. This will allow me to differentiate deal premium that Chinese investors pay for deals from 
the deal premiums paid by investors from others parts of the world.  Some variables that can be an important 
determinant of the deal premium, such as industry of the target firm, nature of the source company are not 
available for the sample that include investments from countries other than China. For the Chinese sample, 
there will be a dummy variable for each industry. This will allow me to see how deal premium may differ 
based on the source companies industry.  (Gujarati, 2004)  
 
 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
 
Chinese Statistics from China are usually not very useful in conducting research about sensitive 
political topics. Since acquisition premia and a potential overpayment might have consequences on 
competition and disclosure many information about the current situation of the acquirer and its strategy and 
long-term prospect, most acquirer companies prefer to not disclosure acquisition premia. This is not very 
Yit β1'
Xit uit
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different in China. What is special with Chinese FDI statistics is that Hong Kong and other tax heaven are 
popular. Hong Kong serves as a platform to channel cash flows anonymously and round tripping is a 
common phenomenon between China and Hong Kong. The Chinese Statistical Yearbook is a very useful 
and precise data source when it comes to non-sensitive data. Unfortunately, when it comes to investigate 
Chinese merger and acquisition premia in Europe, the best approach is to research the data at the 
target/European side where the payments show up instead of analyzing the statistics of the acquirer.  
Bloomberg is a database that collects data about merger via newspaper interviews, expert interviews, and 
other insider information advantage. To make my data sample not too dependent on one source, I decided 
to back up findings with Pitchbook and S&P Cap IQ. Therefore, data from different sources had to be drawn 
together in Excel and later transferred into STATA. The extraction from Bloomberg did not happened 
without complication and many entries had to be computed manually due to the quantity restriction in 
Bloomberg. My main source for the quantitive analysis is however Bloomberg. 
 
First, a sample of 514 Chinese Investors investing in Europe from 1996–2017 have been drawn. This sample 
consists of Investments, Merger and Acquisitions. The deal status of these transactions is either completed, 
withdrawn or terminated. Other options for deal status would be pending and proposed. I renounced on 
using pending and proposed deals because merger and acquisitions due to their complexity and magnitude 
in capital tend to have a high failing rate and many deals die before they even get signed. I also exclude 
partial acquisitions and multiple acquisitions on the same day. Existing literature excludes spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, exchange offers and 
privatizations. Literature usually excludes spin-offs, recapitalization, self-tender, repurchase, acquisition of 
remaining interest, exchange offers and privatizations. Unfortunately, due to data scarcity, I cannot exclude 
asset sales and minority stake purchases. But I can guarantee that these minority stakes have a value more 
than 20 Million and even though, I do not have very precise data on the percent of stake already acquired, I 
can guarantee at least a certain threshold. Other papers excluded only deals minor to 1 Million, with 20 
Million as the smallest value in the Chinese Sample, I am quite on the safe side. (Guo et al. 2016) 
Moreover, one can divide transactions into cross border merger or domestic merger. In order to investigate 
my research question, domestic deals will be excluded and only investigate cross border merger, since 
domestic merger occur more frequently and are less complex. (Rossi & Volpin, 2004) Of course, the 
circumstances of the takeover account to a large extent. According to literature, the type of transactions 
influences the bid premium tremendously, because in case of a hostile acquisitions or in case of other 
complications, targets use strategies of defense, that lead to higher takeover cost.  (Rossi & Volpin, 2004; 
Sudarsanam et al. 2010, and Ficha et al. 2013) Since, there are no hostile takeovers in my dataset, I can 
neglect this otherwise important detail. Similar to the transaction attitude, the existence of a competing bid 
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might increase the difficulty in wining the bid, and thus increase the bid premium. Unfortunately, there is 
not much data available on the competition situation either.  (Varaiya, 1987, Haunschild,1994, Hambrick & 
Hayward, 1997, etc.) The category "multiple acquirers" is computed automatically by Bloomberg. Deal 
synopsis from Capital IQ and reading news articles would help to complete the database. The true name is 
however not important for my hypothesis since Bloomberg provides me with sufficient information about 
the target country, industry and deal premium to conduct an analysis anonymously in some rare cases.  
 
 Base information like deal amount, target industry, deal date, financial advisor of the acquirer will be 
included in my dataset. Unfortunately, public or private ownership could not be added in the data base, so I 
had to draw a new Chinese sample with Chinese investors buying in Europe in the respective time to edit 
my data base manually with ownership information. There is no distinguished category between mergers or 
acquisitions and Bloomberg displays deals with a minimum value of 5 percent of the outstanding target 
shares sought. A cross-sectional data sample as it consists of a number of individual transactions will be 
employed, each occurring at a different point of time, and where I have drawn together the same variables 
for all observations. Bloomberg calculates the premium by subtracting the 20 days average target stock price 
per share one day prior to the announcement date from the offer price per share and then dividing this 
difference with the 20 days average target stock price (Figure 1). Even thought literature suggests to employ 
mostly one day and 30 days premium. (Hitt et al. 2001) I have chosen to not use this metrics because the 
other metrics was not available for all my sample data provided in Bloomberg. The 20 day premium, is still 
a good dependent variable, because it deals with the problem of information leakage and reaction of the 
market to the announcement of the deal. This metrics is automatically computed by Bloomberg and still 
allows reasonable econometric analysis.  
 
Figure 4.11: Calculation of Acquisition in Bloomberg database 
 
Announced Bid Premium Calculated by Bloomberg Data base:  𝐴𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚=_ _𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 _𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 _𝑝𝑒𝑟 _𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒−2_0_ _𝑑𝑎𝑦 _𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 _𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 _2_0_ _𝑑𝑎𝑦 _𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
_𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 _ 
 
 
The benchmark sample is a sample of cross border transactions in Europe in the period of 1990–2017 with 
similar characteristics. This rare data sample, proves of 146.177 merger and acquisition or investments 
transactions occurred in total. Out of these deals 139.646 are either completed, terminated or withdrawn. If 
I chose cross border deals, 66. 566 deals remain. Out of these 37 701 deals are from a public acquirer so this 
number is somewhat similar to the Chinese sample and more or less half of the population is conducted by 
a public acquirer. I controlled for similar characteristics like in the Chinese sample.  
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Dependent Variable: Deal Premium 
 
I will use two measures of deal premia: my first premium measure is announced premium which is ready in 
the data set. However, announced premium variable exists only for 35 deals for China where is it exists for 
a lot more deals for Non-Chinese deals. In order to get more robust coefficient and standard errors, I will 
generate an alternative deal premium measure. I will make use of the definitions of deal premium that exists 
in the literature. Acquisition or deal premium is defined as the difference between the actual cost of 
acquiring a target and an estimate of the targets pre-acquisition value (Guo et. al, 2016). Similarly, 
Sonenshine and Renolds (2014) defines it as the percent difference between the price paid to effectuate the 
merger and the current market price of the target firm. Based on these definitions, I calculate the deal 
premium as the percent difference between announced value of the deal in the market value of the firm 
before the deal. Using these two measures of deal premium will strengthen my analysis, because I will be 
able to see how sensitive the coefficients are to the definition of deal premium. In the figures below, I present 
how deal premium changes based on certain characteristics of the data.  
In the figure below, I present how the average deal premium changes by time. I include both Chinese and 
Non-Chinese group.  The data goes back to 1996 and 2005 for the non-Chinese group and Chinese group 
respectively. So, the time before 2005 reflects Non-Chinese group only. Overall, it can be said that there is 
no trend in the average deal premium over time. Although we see some spikes in certain years. This is 
mainly due to few observations with very high deal premium in the spike year. I dropped outliers but still 
the distribution of deal is not normal. I do not drop very low values because negative premiums are frequent 
and also high premia are possible and reasonable given the massive cash reserves. (Weitzel &King, 2016)   
 
Figure 4.12.: Average Deal Premium by time (both groups together) 
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In the figure below, we can see how average deal premium changes by time for both groups separately. 
There is a huge spike in the Chinese group around 2011. Again, this is mainly due to few observations with 
a very high value of the deal premium for Chinese companies. For the non-Chinese group, no trend is 
observed, while for the Chinese group there seems to be an upward trend over time. 
 
  
Figure 4.13.: Average Deal Premium by time (both groups separately) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It might also be interesting to see how average deal premium differs based on the ownership of the acquirer 
company. We see in the figure below that average deal premium is higher for the non-SOE Chinese 
companies. The finding in the literature suggests the opposite though. In other words, SOE are found to 
offer higher deal premiums compared to non-SOE companies. The figure below simply compares the 
averages without controlling any other factor. In order to see only the effect, SOEs on deal premium many 
factors should be controlled, which is done in the regression analysis.  
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Figure 4.15: Average Deal premium by SOE (all sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16.: Average Deal premium by SOE (China only) 
 
 
 
 
Type of deal (investment, mergers and acquisitions etc.) can be a potential determinant of the deal premium. 
We see in the figure below that M&A deals have an about 5 times higher deal premium compared to non-
M&A deals. Again, it is worthwhile to remember, I don not control for any other factor so far. So, we should 
be cautious about interpreting these figures.  
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Figure 4.17.: Average Deal premium by Deal Type (M&A and others) 
 
 
 
 
Some deals are paid by cash and some are paid by stock and some are paid by debt. So, looking at the 
average premium by payment type will give us better insight about the relationship between payment type 
and deal premium. It is seen in the figure below, that non-cash payments have a higher deal premium. This 
does not come as a surprise because of the already described situation of risk transfer. It is just a lot easier 
to promise somebody equity than cash and in case the synergy does not materialize, the acquirer will have 
to pay twice, once by the too high premium relative to the later synergy and second for the drop in stock 
prices, due to failing to meet expectations. Also from the revenue side future cash flows might be lower and 
therefore with equity the acquirer will participate in losses twice. Offering equity instead of cash is besides 
that, a clear signal to the market about the confidence of the managers conducting the deal, also some sort 
of risk management behavior if one expects synergies to happen less likely. (Rappaport & Sirower 1999)   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18.: Average Deal premium by Payment Type (Cash and others) 
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Finally, the figure below shows the average deal premium for Chinese and non-Chinese groups. It can be 
seen that Chinese companies on average paid higher premium compared to non-Chinese acquirers. Although 
this result seems to support my hypotheses, for a solid analysis, I need to control for other relevant factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.19.: Average Deal premium by Sample Group 
 
 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
 
 
I will use several control variables to analyze the determinants of the deal premium. The choice of control 
variables is based on the existing literature. Depending on data availability for the Chinese and non-Chinese 
group, I use for my two regressions slightly different control variables in the regression analysis. This causes 
the number of observations to differ each time, so I include or remove a control variable from the regression.  
 
 
Announced Total Value 
 
Although I do not use announced total value as an independent variable in my regression analysis, it is 
important to learn more about descriptive statistics for this variable, as I use this variable to calculate the 
deal premium. Announced total value of the deal varies significantly across different observations. In the 
figure below, average total value of the deal is given for Chinese and benchmark sample. It is seen that 
average value of the deal is significantly higher than that of Chinese sample.  
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Figure 4.21.: Average Total Value of Deal by Sample Group (in million dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure below graphs total value of a deal overtime for Chinese and benchmark sample separately. It can 
be seen that there is no general trend in average total value of deal over time for the benchmark sample. 
However, we see spikes randomly in some years. Most striking spike is in 2005 for the benchmark sample. 
This is most likely caused by a very highly valued deal that exists in 2005 for the benchmark group. For the 
Chinese sample average value of the deal seems to increase slightly over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22.: Average Total Value of Deal by time (in million dollars) 
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Deal Type (M&A, investment etc.) 
 
In my data set, there are several types of deals; merger and acquisitions (M&A) and investments. I decided 
to let investments in my data set, even portfolio investments have sometimes different goals and are often 
just short time high yield investment opportunities, in order to account for the big picture of the Chinese 
investment activities in Europe and due to the scarcity of data. In order to let things comparable, I do adjust 
this to both data samples. Most Chinese investment in Europe goes into existing, established firms. There 
are almost no greenfield projects. Unfortunately, I do not have more precise information about the 
percentage of green field investments. However, I have precise data about Investments, Joint Venture and 
M&A. In my dataset there are no joint ventures, and only M&A and investments deals. These two types of 
deals that might affect the deal premium, so it must be controlled for in the regression analysis.  I create a 
dummy variable for M&A, which takes the value 1 if the deal type is M&A and 0 otherwise.  It is seen in 
the table below that 72% of all the deals in the data are M&A.  For the Chinese sample share of M&A is 
61%, while it is 82% for the benchmark group. 
 
Table 4.23: Deal type by sample group 
All Sample Deal Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Investment 307 27.73 27.73 
M&A 800 72.27 100 
Total 1,107 100  
Chinese 
Sample 
Deal Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Investment 202 39.3 39.3 
M&A 312 60.7 100 
Total 514 100  
Benchmark  
Sample 
Deal Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Investment 105 17.71 17.71 
M&A 488 82.29 100 
Total 593 100  
 
 
 
Payment Type (Cash, stock, debt) 
 
Deals can be agreed upon certain payment types such as cash, stock or debt. A premium can differ based on 
payment type of the deal. So it is reasonable to control for the payment type in the regression analysis. I 
create a dummy variable for the payment type, which is equal to one if the payment type is cash and zero if 
it is stock or debt. The table below presents the distribution of payment type for all the sample, the Chinese 
sample and the benchmark sample. According to the table, in the Chinese sample and the benchmark sample, 
86% of the deals are cash deals. So there is not any variation in payment type for the two samples. According 
to literature, differences in payment types used to be historic and in the past cash payment was more 
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common.  (Rappaport & Sirower, 1999) However, despite this historic fact, there is an important difference 
between these two types of payment. According to theory, the main distinction between cash and stock 
transactions is the transfer of risk.  In cash transactions, acquiring shareholders take on the entire risk that 
the expected synergy will not be generated. In stock transactions, that risk is shared with the selling 
shareholders.  
 
If the share price drops after the transaction is completed or the hoped synergy effects do not realize, the 
acquirer that paid with shares has to pay twice, once with the shares of the price and second with a decreasing 
value of the shares. Research consistently shows that the market takes the issuance of stock by a company 
as a sign that the company’s managers believe the stock to be overvalued. If the management makes the 
choice to use stock to finance an acquisition, the company’s stock is likely to fall.  (Rappaport & Sirower, 
1999)  The resulting problem is that undervaluing shares or issuing new shares is also going to penalize 
current shareholders, which might be even worse. The target companies must be able to bring forward 
explanations to their own stockholders why they have to share synergy gains of the transaction with the 
stockholders of the acquired company. In short, the payment method can be understood as some sort of 
signal. If an acquiring company’s managers believe that the market undervalues their shares, the logical 
implication of this manager would be to choose a cash offer. But sometimes what a manager says and what 
is the reality is not really the same. Sometimes managers send signals to the market even if they think 
differently. Often managers bluff and say that their shares are undervalued and still proceed with a stock 
offer. (Sirower, 1999) Acquirers who use stock tend to be those with overvalued shares, thus, the premium 
they confer is illusory. Therefore, it takes much more conviction to spend hard cash. (Lowenstein, 1997)  
 
Table 4.24: Payment type by sample group  
 
All Sample Payment Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-Cash 149 13.46 13.46 
Cash 958 86.54 100 
Total 1,107 100  
Chinese Sample Payment Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-Cash 71 13.81 13.81 
Cash 443 86.19 100 
Total 514 100  
Benchmark  
Sample 
Payment Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-Cash 78 13.15 13.15 
Cash 515 86.85 100 
Total 593 100  
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Number of Employees 
 
Firm size is a very important factor, that plays a role in many financial statistics/ratios. Target firm’s size 
can be an important factor in determining how much premium an acquirer is wiling to pay for a target firm. 
There are numerous statistics that are used for firm size such as firm’s revenue, total assets or number of 
employees. Number of employees will be used to control for firm size. This data exists for both Chinese 
and Benchmark sample. Summary statistics for number of employees is given in the descriptive statistics 
table below.  In the regression analysis, the natural logarithm of number of employees will be used, rather 
than the raw number because doing so reduces the heteroscedasticity problem and makes interpretation 
easier (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Boston Consulting Group (2007) shows that “megadeals” priced at more 
than $1 billion destroy nearly twice as much value relative to smaller transactions. Also in line with Moeller 
et al. 2004, Loderer and Martin (1990) argue that acquirers lose more in large deals because they pay too 
much. This can be the case if confident managers overestimate the possibility of generating value. (Roll, 
1986; Hayward and Habrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2008) Moreover, managers may also pay more 
for a large target because this large target might offer other incentives that could benefit the manager 
privately. (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; 
Harford and Li, 2007; Moeller et al., 2004).   
 
 
Ownership  
 
Literature has always tried to answer the question if managers in state-owned enterprises decide in their own 
interest or in the interests of shareholders. Sometimes the incentives of managers stand in conflict with the 
benefits of shareholders. These gains can be manifold: more prestige because of managing a larger firm, 
better remuneration or other perks, and do not have to worry that the stock price goes down and a hostile 
take over might occur.  (Bargeron et al.2008) (Haleblian et al.,2009; Shimizu et al., 2004;) The result out of 
this conflict might be a moral hazard problem that makes managers decide in their own interest. The table 
below presents the frequency distribution of the SOE variable for the Chinese sample only. According to 
the table, 58 percent of the Chinese acquirer companies are SOEs. From a corporate governance perspective, 
research reveals that ownership structures are important for the degree of managers’ power and control in 
the deal process and their opportunity to block risky M&As (De Miguel et al., 2004; Schleifer and Vishny, 
1996; La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In case of failure of a bidding attempt, there are 
more adverse consequences for managers of public firms than for managers of private firms. On the other 
hand, transparency issues have adverse effects for SOE. A public firm might not have much interest in 
disclosure information and showing too much of their strategy, in order to avoid competitors to take 
measures. (Bargeron et al. 2008) (Lehn and Zhao 2006) Agency problems might be more serious in many 
public firms than in private firms. (Jensen 1989). In addition, private firms differ from the bidding behavior 
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of public firms in that private firms are much less reluctant to walk away from a deal than are public firms—
while 37.4% of the offers by private firms are withdrawn, only 16.9% of the offers by public firms are 
withdrawn. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis, that failure cost more for public firms, but it 
could also reflect greater agency costs in the typical public firm relative to private firms or a greater 
willingness of private firms to make offers that have little chance of success (Bargeron et al. 2008)  
 
 
Table 4.25: Frequency distribution of SOE (All sample) 
SOE Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-SOE 451 40.74 40.74 
SOE 656 59.26 100 
Total 1,107 100  
 
 
 
 Table 4.26.: Frequency distribution of SOE (Chinese sample only) 
 
SOE Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-SOE 214 41.63 41.63 
SOE 300 58.37 100 
Total 514 100  
 
 
 
ROA 
 
Return on asset (ROA) of a firm is another very important financial ratio that is used in empirical studies in 
finance and economics. I will use ROA of the target firm as a control variable. ROA exist for both: the 
Chinese and the benchmark group, so I can use this variable in my main regression equation. Summary 
statistics for ROA is given in the descriptive statistics table below. According to the free cash flow 
hypothesis and Ficha et al. (2013), cash-rich firms tend to do acquisitions, even those who destroy value 
when they have abundant cash reserves. Therefore, it is reasonable to control for ROA.  
 
Industry 
 
Some industries are designated by the Chinese government as favored sectors. It is reasonable to believe 
that favored sectors can afford to pay even higher premiums in order to acquire foreign targets. Those 
strategic sectors might be: metal mining, oil and gas extraction, and automotive. (Zhang, 2010) It is 
important to control for industry because different industries have their specific rules, investments logic and 
regulations. (Harford, 2005) In order to control unobserved heterogeneity across different industries of 
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target firms, I will use industry dummies. Unobserved heterogeneity refers to any unobserved differences 
in target industries that might affect the deal premium. These differences are assumed to be time invariant, 
as it is specific to industry. One way to estimate the unobserved heterogeneity is to include a dummy variable 
for each industry of the target firm. In my data set there are 9 industry areas for target firms. Main industries 
include, basic materials, communication, consumer, energy, financial, industrial, technology, utilities, and 
diversified. Note that the industry variable is available for the Chinese data only. A frequency table of 
industry sectors is given in the table below. According to the table consumer industry has the highest share 
in the data with 26.1%. It is followed by industrial sector, which consists of 24.1% of the data. The lowest 
share belongs to utilities sector with only 1.5%.  The pie chart below also demonstrates the frequency 
distribution of target firm industries.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.27.: Frequency Distribution of Industry of Target firms (Chinese Data only) 
 
Target Industry Sector Freq. Percent Cum. 
  Basic Materials 47 9.16 9.16 
  Communications 35 6.82 15.98 
  Consumer 134 26.12 42.11 
  Diversified 16 3.12 45.22 
  Energy 39 7.6 52.83 
  Financial 56 10.92 63.74 
  Industrial 124 24.17 87.91 
  Technology 54 10.53 98.44 
  Utilities 8 1.56 100 
  Total 513 100  
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   Table 4.28. : Distribution of Industry of Target firms (Chinese Data only) 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
M&A is a very cyclical business and therefore one has to account for the time factor. In 2004, for instance 
very low premia occurred more frequently while in 2008-2013 premia have been high. The 2008 financial 
crisis hit the economy worldwide, thus the firm values were much lower; while the wave in 2003 was 
mainly caused by the introduction of financial derivatives and the dramatical growth of the stock market. 
My empirical analysis employs therefore a set of time fixed effects to account for aggregate economy 
wide events that may occur over time and affect all the firms simultaneously such as economic crisis. In 
other words, the year variable will be capturing any changes over time that might affect my dependent 
variable deal premium, which are not controlled by my control variables. The data for the Chinese sample 
includes deals starting from 2002 to 2017. For the benchmark data, it covers years 1996 through 2017. 
The table below presents the frequency distribution of years for my data. It can be seen that number of 
deals are highest for the years, 2014, 2015 and 2016. We see that the number of observation is increasing 
each year. Media is maybe more active in publishing sensitive data and in recent years acquisition premia 
become more often public than it has been the case 20 years ago, but besides the availability of data, there 
is a clear tendency that mergers occur more nowadays more frequently than this has been the case in the 
past. 
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Table 4.29.: Frequency Distribution of Year 
 
year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1996 1 0.09 0.09 
1998 19 1.72 1.81 
1999 26 2.35 4.16 
2000 33 2.99 7.15 
2001 36 3.26 10.41 
2002 19 1.72 12.13 
2003 35 3.17 15.29 
2004 28 2.53 17.83 
2005 26 2.35 20.18 
2006 42 3.8 23.98 
2007 64 5.79 29.77 
2008 65 5.88 35.66 
2009 46 4.16 39.82 
2010 52 4.71 44.52 
2011 61 5.52 50.05 
2012 57 5.16 55.2 
2013 65 5.88 61.09 
2014 97 8.78 69.86 
2015 145 13.12 82.99 
2016 143 12.94 95.93 
2017 45 4.07 100 
Total 1,105 100  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Table 4.210.: Descriptive Stats for China 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Deal Premium 101 1.091304 8.044571 -0.9958082 60.05487 
Announced Deal 
Premium 36 19.32111 36.89963 -98.78 113.32 
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Cash 821 0.6869671 0.4640103 0 1 
M&A 821 0.637028 0.48115 0 1 
Announced 
Value of Deal 514 435.2724 1283.95 0 14134.77 
Total Value  93 23127.64 95534.89 -66.6281 876593 
ROA 268 7.928966 97.92888 -173.369 769.122 
Target Number 
of Employees 
125 4139.256 8492.066 2 36763 
SOE 821 0.5249695 0.4996805 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 4.211: Descriptive Stats for Benchmark Group 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Deal Premium 669 0.388026 4.047433 -0.999975 60.05487 
Announced Deal 
Premium 612 26.19515 34.09134 -98.78 301.97 
Cash 1420 0.7605634 0.42689 0 1 
M&A 1420 0.715493 0.4513383 0 1 
Announced 
Value of Deal 1110 1089.781 7403.543 0 185075 
Market Value  223 16703.94 68115.44 -66.6281 876593 
ROA 839 2.8151 63.68893 -199.145 769.122 
Target Number 
of Employees 
471 3589.567 7228.446 1 49709 
SOE 1107 0.5925926 0.4915739 0 1 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Deal Premium 568 0.2629714 2.789701 -0.999975 44.05851 
Announced Deal 
Premium 576 26.62477 33.89634 -98.78 301.97 
Cash 599 0.8614357 0.34578 0 1 
M&A 599 0.8230384 0.3819552 0 1 
Announced 
Value of Deal 596 1654.24 10002.62 0.08 185075 
Total Value  130 12108.52 37742.2 2.02824 377574 
ROA 571 0.4148967 38.1207 -199.145 769.122 
Target Number 
of Employees  
346 3390.98 6716.626 1 49709 
SOE 593 0.6003373 0.4902425 0 1 
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4.3 Hypothesis and Model 
 
H1: Chinese companies pay significant higher acquisition premia than companies in the benchmark group 
H2: Chinese SOE pay significant higher acquisition premia than Chinese POE 
 
 
The Model 1  
 
 
Where Premium is the deal premium. China is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the acquirer is from 
China and, 0 otherwise, Year is a trend variable, MA is a dummy which equals to 1 if type of deal is M&A, 
and 0 otherwise, logEmpNum is the natural log of number of number of employees of the target firm, ROA 
is return on asset, Cash is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if payment is made by cash and 0 otherwise 
and ui is error term. A common problem in a regression analysis is heteroscedasticity. In order to overcome 
this problem, I run regression equations with robust standard errors. Also to make sure that the OLS 
assumptions hold, I will perform several tests after the regression. 
 
In order to understand the determinants of deal premiums, specifically for the Chinese sample, and to make 
use of variables that exist for Chinese data only, I run a separate regression for the Chinese sample. This 
regression will allow me to see the effects of industry and SOE on deal premium. It is argued in the literature 
that (Guo et al. 2016) whether the acquirer company being a SOE or not matters in how much acquirers pay 
for a deal. The regression equation specific to Chinese sample will be: 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Pr emiumit = β0 +β1Yeart +β2MAit +β3 log(EmpNum)it +β4ROAit +β5Cashit +β6SOEit +β7Industryit +uit  
 
Where Premium is the deal premium. Year is a trend variable, MA is a dummy which equals to 1 if type of 
deal is M&A, and 0 otherwise, logEmpNum is the natural log of number of employees of the target firm, 
ROA is return on asset, Cash is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if payment is made by cash and 0 
otherwise, SOE is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the acquirer is a SOE and 0 otherwise, 
Industry is a set of dummy variables that represents industry of the target firm, and ui is error term.  
Pr emiumit = β0 +β1Chinait +β2Yeart +β3MAit +β4 log(EmpNum)it +β5SOEit +β6Cashit +uit
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V. The Results 
This paper proved that my two hypothesis hold true. The first hypothesis tests if Chinese companies pay 
significant higher acquisition premia than companies in the benchmark group and the second proves that 
Chinese SOE pay significant higher acquisition premia than Chinese POE. Both hypothesis hold true and 
the results are presented in the section below. In the following section, OLS regression results are 
presented in the following tables. In the first column, I present regression results when the dependent 
variable is announced premium, which is provided by Bloomberg. According to the results, China, Year 
and M&A variables are significant. The coefficient for China is 6.876 and significant at 10% level. It 
suggests that Chinese acquirer’s deal premium is 6,876 units bigger than non-Chinese acquirers.  This 
finding supports my hypothesis about Chinese acquirers’ willingness to pay for deals. The Year variable is 
significant at 1% and the M&A variable is significant at the 5% suggesting my prior reckon that mainly 
M&A deals are related to higher premia and that portfolio investments are not affected by this recent 
overpayment trend. On average each year announced deal premium increases about 1.2. The deal premium 
is about 10 units higher for M&A deals than investment deals. In other words, acquirers are willing to pay 
about 10 units higher premium in M&A deals compared to investment deals.  Coefficient for the Cash 
variable is -2.08, which means if the deal is paid out by cash rather than stock or debt, then deal premium 
is about 2 units less. However, this is not significant statistically. Coefficient of number of employees 
suggests that when the target firm’s employee number increases by 1 percent deal premium decreases by 
0.892 units. This coefficient is not statistically significant. However, the sign of the coefficient is in line 
with literature, but there are many different since there is no clear opinion about the relationship of size 
and premia in literature. I therefore assume that one can not draw conclusions on the size of the firm only 
and that many other factors influence the size of the acquisition premium. The SOE coefficient is 10.91 
and significant at the 1%. level.  This means that SOE companies pay 10.91 unit more deal premium 
compared to non-SOE. This supports my hypothesis and shows that the ownership structure is related to 
the size of the premium, in both cases, in the Chinese sample but also in comparison to the benchmark 
sample.  
 
In the second column of the table, I present OLS regression results when the dependent variable is deal 
premium based on my own calculation. According to the results, the China and the number of employee 
variable are statistically significant. Chinese acquirers’ deal premium is about 1.488 units higher than that 
of non-Chinese acquirers.  When number of employees increases by 1%, the deal premium decreases by 
0.235 units and is significant at the 5 percent level.  This finding suggests that acquirers are willing to pay 
higher premium for smaller target companies. In general, this finding is in line with literature. But on the 
other hand, concerning size the is no general widely accepted truth and higher premiums are possible for 
both: smaller and bigger companies. Year and M&A variables are statistically insignificant and therefore 
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mergers are related to higher premia than simple portfolio investments. The SOE coefficient is 6.13 and 
significant at 10%. SOE companies pay 10.91 unit more deal premium compared to non-SOE. This supports 
again my hypothesis and emphasizes the role of ownership on acquisition premium in the Chinese context. 
 
 
 
      Table 5.11: OLS regression results (All sample) 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Announced Premium Premium(own 
calculation) 
   
China 6.876* 1.488** 
 (3.743) (0.654) 
Year 1.207*** -0.027 
 (0.444) (0.064) 
M&A 10.242** 0.610 
 (4.237) (0.577) 
Cash -2.083 -0.643 
 (6.136) (0.846) 
lognofemployees -0.892 -0.235** 
 (0.773) (0.109) 
SOE 10.91*** 6.13* 
 (3.771) (3.659) 
Constant -2,425*** 56.02 
 (904.0) (129.2) 
   
Observations 376 424 
R-squared 0.18 0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the table below, I present the OLS regression results for the Chinese sample only. Column 1 of the table 
uses announced premium as a dependent variable. According to the results, the number of employees, SOE 
and some industry dummies are significant. The coefficient of the number of employee suggests that if the 
number of employees increase by 1 percent, announced deal premium decreases by 8.4. As mentioned 
previously, this is probably because smaller firms are perceived to have bigger potential in terms of growth 
and profitability. These findings are in line with literature and a broad body of literature found that 
megadeals usually just destroy value instead of creating shareholder value. (Moeller et al. 2004. Loderer 
and Martin 1990) 
 
The SOE variable of my second model, that is answering the question is also significant at the 10% 
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significance level. Chinese SOE acquirers pay about 28 units higher premium compared to Chinese non-
SOE acquirers. This confirms the lending bias against Chinese private companies.  The four big state banks 
are mainly financing SOEs and other agents that put into practice reform policy. Moreover, there are sets of 
industry dummies included in the regression. The reference industry category is basic materials and got 
chosen automatically from STATA. Consumer industry deals have significantly higher deal premium 
compared to basic materials.  Financial and Industrial categories have significantly lower deal premium 
compared to basic materials. Which supports the findings that the second Chinese merger wave was mainly 
a resource seeking merger wave. This finding also supports the resource theory in its very literal sense.  
 
In the second column of the Table, I present regression results when the dependent variable is premium 
based on my own calculations.  Both the number of employees and the SOE variables continue to be 
significant. In fact, the SOE variable is significant at 1% significance level now.  The coefficient of SOE 
implies that SOE acquirers pay 10 units higher premium than non-SOE acquirers. This result is consistent 
with the literature and confirms high agency and transaction costs. (Guo et al. 2016) The coefficient of 
number of employees suggests that a one percent increase in the number of employees decreases deal 
premium by 1 unit at the five percent level.  The only statistically significant industry dummy are 
‘consumer’, ‘financial‘ and ‘industrial‘, which is significant at 5% and 10% level. The coefficient of 
‘consumer’ implies that consumer sector companies are paid about 10 units higher premium than basic 
materials.  The descriptive statistics of the sample has shown that most of the deals in general are in the 
consumer industry which supports the fact, that Chinese acquirer try to improve branding and to acquire 
management expertise in this area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12.: OLS Regression Results (Chinese Sample only) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Announced 
Premium 
Premium(own 
calculation) 
   
Year 2.359 -0.701 
 (3.852) (0.517) 
Cash -8.986 0.621 
 (32.30) (4.037) 
MandA -6.698 -1.191 
 (20.19) (2.476) 
lognofemployees -8.437* -1.057* 
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Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
 
 
VI. Limitations and further research 
 
As some research suggest, it could have been interesting to further distinguish the ownership variable. 
Information like family ownership, institutional ownership could be more precisely distinguished. 
Unfortunately, Bloomberg did not allow to further distinguish these details. However, in the Chinese context 
the information SOE or Non-SOE has quite of an explanatory power in determining the situation of a 
company. The same goes for the amount of stake already acquired, it would be interesting to further define 
this variable. There is a body of literature arguing that acquirer already owning a stake are more likely to 
pay high acquisition premia. Likewise, I could not exclude explicitly Hong Kong but only chose mainland 
China. I have checked the dataset for companies outside of China and could not detect any Hong Kong 
based deal, but I know that Hong Kong serves as a platform for FDI from China. So even tough if I do not 
have included Hong Kong in my data sample, there might be some dubious channels that orchestra Chinese 
 (4.423) (0.587) 
SOE 28.68* 10.022*** 
 (16.50) (2.889) 
Communication  2.590 
  (11.12) 
Consumer 7.15** 9.965** 
 (3.09) (4.659) 
Diversified  0.826 
  (6.773) 
Energy 10.94 2.419 
 (28.41) (5.358) 
Financial -93.12** 5.154 
 (42.66) (5.881) 
Industrial -66.63* 4.566 
 (37.13) (4.774) 
Technology -31.13 5.274 
   
 (35.05) (6.152) 
Utilities  4.671 
  (11.36) 
Constant -4,729 1,415 
 (7,734) (1,039) 
   
Observations 29 71 
R-squared 0.508 0.170 
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FDI via Hong Kong. Similar research on the topic with another database suggest that around half of the 
sample are Hong Kong based transactions.  (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; Peng, 2012: 98) Tracking capital 
flow leaving China is in general a problem impossible to overcome and as way to deal with the problem, I 
have renounced to use Chinese statistics in the first place, but relied on Bloomberg, a database that collects 
information from western media. Cayman Island and other islands are famous for excel Chinese 
transactions. I have tried to control for this effect in the benchmark sample, but I am aware that I can not 
entirely avoid that Chinese deals are compared with Chinese deals.  Also western companies use tax heaven, 
so excluding all the tax heaven would distort realities even more. When searching for my data in Bloomberg, 
I realized that many deals that appeared on the European side to have happened – but did not show up on 
the Chinese side. This mismatch can only be explained by deals not being defined. However, despite these 
limitations Bloomberg can be considered as a reliable data source and data is researched by Bloomberg 
analysts thanks to newspaper articles, expert interviews and other reliable information sources from the 
European side instead of the Chinese side. (Zhang & Ebbers, 2010; Hanemann & Rosen, 2012)  
 
Furthermore, a more complex empirical model and more advanced methods could have been better to 
support the hypothesis. Due to my small sample size in the Chinese sample, I could not afford to exclude 
financial firms, even if this would have been appropriate. Unfortunately, financial firms have different goals 
and objectives when acquiring targets and comparing them to normal firms is not ideal. However, due to 
the general scarcity of the data, I have accepted this limitation and decided that a comparison is still 
reasonable and interesting. As suggestion for future research, I would suggest to investigate the target market 
to book value. This metrics is described by literature of having a great impact on acquisition premia. This 
is mainly due to the fact, that this ratio gives information about the valuation of a company and if this 
company might be even in distress. Another interesting variable to control for would be the percentage of 
shares held at announcement. Prior research finds that, the bid premia would decrease with the original 
percentage of shares held at announcement. Shleifer & Vishny (1986). Similar to this important fact, 
information about the number of competitors would be a factor that worth controlling for. (Varaiya, 1987, 
Haunschild,1994, Hambrick & Hayward, 1997, etc.) However, much of the corporate governance research 
is based on surveys, and these surveys interviewed managers about their incentives when engaging in deals. 
As all studies were based on interviews asking the managers directly instead of asking other shareholder the 
outcomes might not entirely reflect reality.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This empirical work has shown, that in average Chinese inventors tend to pay higher acquisition premia 
than other investors for similar targets. The contribution to literature is an update of prior research attempts 
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with more and more recent data. Moreover, the trial to define the acquisition premium in different ways so 
that the available data can be used more effectively to account for limitations of econometric methods and 
to overcome the problem of a too small sample size of other prior research attempts. Given the political 
context, that the Chinese investors are not only paying higher premiums, because of poor managerial 
decisions but also because these investments serve a higher national interest. Overcapacities of the Chinese 
economy are a serious threat to the overall stability of the Chinese economy and industrial policy is aiming 
at shifting the economy towards domestic consumption. Moreover, two decades of export-led growth and 
labor intense manufacturing allowed the Chinese government to hort immense foreign exchange reserves. 
The Chinese government has many incentives to invest abroad and the timing of this movement is not a 
coincidence. The second investment wave occurred in Europe at a time of political uncertainty and economic 
instability after the financial debt crisis. After the European debt crisis, many targets, especially in Spain, 
Greece, Portugal became very affordable and attractive to hold long term. Moreover, according to experts, 
Chinese assets seem to be on the other hand overvalued. Even if the acquisition premium seems to be high 
in the European context, compared to similar targets, European targets of the same characteristics seem as 
a bargain to Chinese investors. Hanemann and Rosen (2012), find that asset valuation fluctuates with the 
global growth cycles, therefore countries with higher growth rates might offer higher premia. This confident 
bidding behavior might be due to the strong overall economic situation of the Chinese economy and the lack 
of investment opportunities of Chinese saving account holder due to weaker property rights and in general 
the financial system of China, that is still under reform. The stock market is composed of state-owned firms 
with government support but soft budget constraints. It is therefore not surprising, that given the relative 
stability of European markets, Chinese investors value European targets higher than the overall market 
would do. In addition to that, Chinese brands seek to enter foreign markets and brands and this market access 
is a key step in further pushing forward internationalization. Besides, European markets are a solution to 
deal with overcapacities due to a slowing down of the economy and the new shift towards domestic 
consumption that is not yet accomplished and on the other hand new growth potential for new Chinese 
brands. When it comes to high technology and innovation, fierce competition and expensive knowledge 
intensive research is a key to innovation. China has shown a remarkable progress, but there are some fields 
in which European companies still have more advanced technology. Technology transfer is another key 
reason to pay more than would be rational. The same goes for strategic competitors in high tech industries. 
If a Chinese company cannot compete with a European company, why not just buying this company instead 
of trying desperately to compete? Especially since the Chinese government is trying to win new markets. 
(Gapper, 2016). Obviously, geopolitical aspects like the new OBOR policy and the Going-Out-policy are 
key driver. The access to resources and China’s new leading role in the developing world are strategic 
investments. However, much of the driving forces behind premia remain a puzzle and more research has to 
be done and many aspects could not be covered. The role of supply and demand for instance. As 
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Slusky&Caves (1991). describes, competition has a severe effect on premia. China has entered the world 
scene and might increases the number of bidders by being an additional agent. The simple fact that there are 
more bidders competing for one target and the appearance of a non traditional and new player might increase 
demand and lead to higher premia. 
 
From an institutional economics perspective, there is reason to believe that competition among managers 
might incentivize to engage in value destroying transactions. In the Chinese institutional context, 
competition among local governments has led to a skyrocketing debt burden and these competition 
structures are common inside the CCP. Fiscal federalism in China has lead to competition structures among 
local governments that incentivizes to achieve growth targets by all means and even taking high leverage 
and risk. It is likely that such competition structures exist among SOE managers that incentivizes SOE 
managers to acquire targets abroad, even if acquisition premia are consuming value creating effects. As as 
suggestion for further research, a combination of empirical and institutional perspective might help to deeper 
study causes of higher premia of Chinese SOE in Europe. 
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VIIII. Appendix 
 
BenchmarkSample     
Rank  Target Country Deal number  Percent 
1 U.K.  162 27,09 
2 France 71 11,87 
3 Germany 53 8,86 
4 Sweden 41 6,86 
5 Norway 35 5,85 
6 Italy 28 4,68 
7 Netherland, Poland 27 4,52 
8 Finland, Denmark, Spain 13 2,17 
9 Austria 14 2,34 
10 Switzerland 11 1,84 
11 Greece 12 2,01 
12 Turkey 8 1,34 
13 Hungaria 6 1,00 
14 Russia, Ireland 5 0,84 
15 Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Guernsey 4 0,67 
 Portugal, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania  3 0,5 
17 Isle of Man, Malta, Estonia, Cyprus 2 0,33 
18 Gibraltar, Faroe Island, Serbia, Iceland 1 0,17 
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Rank Target Country Number of Deals Percent  
1 U.K. 187 22,86 
2 Germany 153 18,7 
3 Netherlands 64 7,82 
3 France 64 7,82 
4 Italy 54 6,6 
5 Switzerland 37 4,52 
7 Spain 32 3,91 
7 Russia 28 3,42 
8 Belgium, Ireland 17 2,08 
9 Denmark 15 1,83 
10 Finland 13 1,59 
11 Portugal, Sweden, Austria 12 1,47 
11 Sweden 12 1,47 
11 Austria 12 1,47 
12 Cyprus 11 1,34 
13 Norway, Poland 10 1,22 
14 Multiple 8 2,4 
 13 Turkey 9 1,1 
 12 Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg 
7 0,86 
 14 Hungary, Bulgaria 6 0,73 
 15 Greece 5 0.61   
 16 Romania 4 0.49   
 17 N.A. 2 0,24   
 18 Slovakia, Lithuania, Croatia, 
Isle, Azerb. 
1 0,12   
 18 Ukraine, Liechtenstein, 1 0,12   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
